fix: build the runner with a schema that accepts Gitea 28's matrix jobs

Gitea 28 adds job-index and job-total under strategy in the workflow it
sends for a matrix job, and forgejo-runner's schema refuses them, so
every matrix job dies before its first step (zegit image-gitea.yml run
23992, the v0.1.52 tag build). No forgejo-runner release accepts them
(checked through 13.2.1). Build the runner from v12.11.1 at its commit
with a one-file schema patch and two tests, one of them the real payload
of that failed job; the build runs them. Bases are pinned by digest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wWyCiV27KmNSauYTdLyp7

.github/workflows/build-image-gitea.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+name: build image (gitea)
+
+# Publishes the runner toolchain image from the SELF-HOSTED Gitea runners, via
+# the in-cluster rootless buildkitd — the same path zegit's own images already
+# use (zegit .github/workflows/image-gitea.yml).
+#
+# Why this exists alongside build-image.yml: that workflow is GitHub-only, so
+# the image the Gitea runners are BUILT FROM could only be produced by GitHub.
+# When GitHub Actions became unavailable on 2026-08-29 that circularity bit —
+# the fix for a missing tool in this very image (openssl/jq, whose absence
+# blocked v0.0.134 and v0.0.135) could not be published on the forge the project
+# is moving to. This removes the dependency.
+#
+# build-image.yml's header says the runners cannot build images because rootless
+# buildah needs user namespaces the pod does not have. That is true of buildah
+# IN THE JOB, and irrelevant here: buildkitd is its own hardened workload in
+# buildkit-system, and this job only speaks to it over the network with
+# buildctl. Nothing is built inside the runner container.
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      tag:
+        description: 'Image tag, e.g. 12.11.1-ci6 (upstream runner version + ci revision)'
+        required: true
+        type: string
+      sign_only:
+        description: 'Sign the already-published tag instead of building it (zegit#262: signs an image published before signing existed)'
+        required: false
+        default: false
+        type: boolean
+  push:
+    branches: [master]
+    paths:
+      - 'Dockerfile'
+      - 'patches/**'
+      - '.github/workflows/build-image-gitea.yml'
+
+env:
+  BUILDKIT_HOST: tcp://buildkitd.buildkit-system.svc.cluster.local:1234
+  BUILDKIT_VERSION: v0.32.2
+  REGISTRY: gitea.langenoja.se
+  IMAGE_PATH: zegit-zoo/zegit-forgejo-runner
+  COSIGN_VERSION: v3.1.3
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    # Gitea-only: buildkitd is an in-cluster service that GitHub runners cannot
+    # reach. build-image.yml still covers the GitHub/ghcr.io side.
+    if: ${{ github.server_url != 'https://github.com' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 45
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # Workspace-local because the runner is non-root and cannot write to
+      # /usr/local/bin. The smoke test uses the FULL PATH deliberately:
+      # $GITHUB_PATH only takes effect for SUBSEQUENT steps, so a bare
+      # `buildctl --version` here would be command-not-found.
+      - name: Install buildctl
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          case "$(uname -m)" in
+            x86_64) arch=amd64;;
+            aarch64) arch=arm64;;
+            *) echo "::error::unsupported arch $(uname -m)"; exit 1;;
+          esac
+          mkdir -p "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.bin"
+          curl -fsSL "https://github.com/moby/buildkit/releases/download/${BUILDKIT_VERSION}/buildkit-${BUILDKIT_VERSION}.linux-${arch}.tar.gz" \
+            | tar -xz -C "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.bin" --strip-components=1 bin/buildctl
+          echo "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
+          "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.bin/buildctl" --version
+
+      - name: buildkitd reachable
+        run: buildctl debug workers
+
+      # A master push VALIDATES that the Dockerfile still builds on both arches
+      # but publishes nothing; only an explicit dispatch names a tag and pushes.
+      # Guessing a tag from a branch push would silently mint versions.
+      #
+      # Tags are immutable (zegit#262): consumers pin tag@digest, and the
+      # registry drops the old manifest when a tag moves, so re-publishing a
+      # tag breaks every pin on it. A build refuses an existing tag; sign_only
+      # refuses a tag that does not exist.
+      - id: meta
+        env:
+          EVENT: ${{ github.event_name }}
+          INPUT_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
+          SIGN_ONLY: ${{ inputs.sign_only }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ "$EVENT" = "workflow_dispatch" ]; then
+            pull=$(curl -fsS "https://${REGISTRY}/v2/token?scope=repository:${IMAGE_PATH}:pull&service=container_registry" | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["token"])')
+            tags=$(curl -fsS -H "Authorization: Bearer ${pull}" "https://${REGISTRY}/v2/${IMAGE_PATH}/tags/list?n=10000" | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print("\n".join(json.load(sys.stdin).get("tags") or []))')
+            if printf '%s\n' "$tags" | grep -qxF "$INPUT_TAG"; then
+              if [ "$SIGN_ONLY" != "true" ]; then
+                echo "::error::${IMAGE_PATH}:${INPUT_TAG} already exists; tags are immutable, so nothing is overwritten (to sign it, dispatch with sign_only)"; exit 1
+              fi
+            elif [ "$SIGN_ONLY" = "true" ]; then
+              echo "::error::${IMAGE_PATH}:${INPUT_TAG} is not published; nothing to sign"; exit 1
+            fi
+            echo "push=true"  >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            echo "tag=${INPUT_TAG}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            echo "sign_only=${SIGN_ONLY}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "push=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            echo "tag=ci-validation" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+
+      # Refuse a publish that cannot complete, rather than reporting success
+      # having pushed nothing. A validation run needs no credentials.
+      # The Gitea Actions token cannot write packages; this needs an explicit
+      # package-write PAT (read:package is pull-only).
+      - name: Registry login
+        if: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.push == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ -z "${TOKEN:-}" ]; then
+            echo "::error::ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN is not visible to this run. It is the org-scoped package-write token every zegit-zoo image workflow uses (docs: flux-config docs/rotation/forge-secrets.yaml); this repository must be able to read the org secret, and the name must match."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          mkdir -p "$HOME/.docker"
+          printf '{"auths":{"%s":{"auth":"%s"}}}\n' \
+            "$REGISTRY" "$(printf 'zegit-zoo:%s' "$TOKEN" | base64 -w0)" \
+            > "$HOME/.docker/config.json"
+
+      - name: Build multi-arch
+        if: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.sign_only != 'true' }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          REF="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.tag }}"
+          # No --output on a validation run: buildctl v0.32 has no "cacheonly"
+          # exporter (run 16, 2026-09-08: 'exporter "cacheonly" could not be
+          # found'), so every push-triggered validation since this workflow
+          # was added had failed — silently, since nothing depended on it. A
+          # build without an exporter still builds every stage on both arches.
+          if [ "${{ steps.meta.outputs.push }}" = "true" ]; then
+            buildctl build --progress=plain \
+              --frontend dockerfile.v0 \
+              --local context=. \
+              --local dockerfile=. \
+              --opt platform=linux/amd64,linux/arm64 \
+              --output "type=image,name=${REF},push=true"
+          else
+            buildctl build --progress=plain \
+              --frontend dockerfile.v0 \
+              --local context=. \
+              --local dockerfile=. \
+              --opt platform=linux/amd64,linux/arm64
+          fi
+
+      # The image is a TOOLCHAIN, so "it built" is not the property that matters
+      # — "it still contains what the gates shell out to" is. build-image.yml
+      # asserts that with `docker run`, which does not exist on these runners;
+      # buildkit can do it directly by building a stage FROM the published image
+      # whose RUN fails when a tool is absent. That is strictly better: buildkit
+      # runs it natively per platform, so a package that resolves on amd64 but
+      # not on arm64 cannot reach half the nodes unnoticed.
+      #
+      # openssl and jq are on this list because their absence blocked v0.0.134
+      # and v0.0.135: the release tag gate shells out to both to verify the
+      # Control Plane's signed quorum verdict, and a missing tool was reported
+      # as "verdict not signed" and "signature FAILED verification" — a tooling
+      # gap narrated as a security verdict. Extend this list whenever a gate
+      # grows a shell dependency; it only covers what someone remembered to add.
+      - name: Assert the published image carries the toolchain the gates need
+        if: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.push == 'true' }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          REF="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.tag }}"
+          work=$(mktemp -d)
+          {
+            echo "FROM ${REF}"
+            echo 'RUN set -eu; \'
+            echo '    python3 -c "import yaml, sys; print(\"python3+yaml\", sys.version.split()[0])"; \'
+            echo '    for t in gcc node bash make curl tar openssl jq chromium-browser psql; do \'
+            echo '      command -v "$t" >/dev/null || { echo "MISSING: $t" >&2; exit 1; }; \'
+            echo '      echo "ok: $t"; \'
+            echo '    done; \'
+            echo '    test -x "$(git --exec-path)/git-http-backend" || { echo "MISSING: git-http-backend" >&2; exit 1; }; \'
+            echo '    echo "ok: git-http-backend"'
+          } > "$work/Dockerfile"
+          cat "$work/Dockerfile"
+          buildctl build --progress=plain \
+            --frontend dockerfile.v0 \
+            --local context="$work" \
+            --local dockerfile="$work" \
+            --opt platform=linux/amd64,linux/arm64
+          echo "✓ toolchain intact on linux/amd64 and linux/arm64"
+
+      # zegit#143/#262: a -ci<N> tag is only a name, and ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN
+      # (readable by every zegit-zoo branch run) can push one. Consumers pin
+      # this image only when `cosign verify` accepts its digest with the
+      # runner-image public key, so every published digest is signed here.
+      # The private key is a REPOSITORY secret of the runner repos only, never
+      # an org secret. Classic .sig tag, no transparency log: the registry is
+      # private and verifiers use --insecure-ignore-tlog with a pinned key.
+      - name: Sign the published image by digest
+        if: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.push == 'true' }}
+        env:
+          COSIGN_KEY_PEM: ${{ secrets.RUNNER_IMAGE_COSIGN_KEY }}
+          COSIGN_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.RUNNER_IMAGE_COSIGN_PASSWORD }}
+          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ -z "${COSIGN_KEY_PEM:-}" ] || [ -z "${COSIGN_PASSWORD:-}" ]; then
+            echo "::error::RUNNER_IMAGE_COSIGN_KEY / RUNNER_IMAGE_COSIGN_PASSWORD are not visible to this run (repository secrets, zegit#262). An unsigned runner image is never pinned."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          case "$(uname -m)" in
+            x86_64) arch=amd64; sum=4629c757b7618056f8ddd7e2625ae9fdd94c0372a65049520bc7d9df9efc7f71;;
+            aarch64) arch=arm64; sum=c5d324e091826b0d7a78eb16fef316450b4eb9aaec045611c08ba06f5e73220a;;
+            *) echo "::error::unsupported arch $(uname -m)"; exit 1;;
+          esac
+          bin="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.bin/cosign"
+          curl -fsSL -o "$bin" "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/${COSIGN_VERSION}/cosign-linux-${arch}"
+          echo "${sum}  ${bin}" | sha256sum -c -
+          chmod +x "$bin"
+          tag="${{ steps.meta.outputs.tag }}"
+          tmp=$(mktemp -d); trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT
+          # Credentials go through 0600 curl configs, never argv (zegit#139).
+          ( umask 077; printf 'user = "zegit-zoo:%s"\n' "$TOKEN" > "$tmp/basic.cfg" )
+          tok=$(curl -fsS -K "$tmp/basic.cfg" "https://${REGISTRY}/v2/token?scope=repository:${IMAGE_PATH}:pull&service=container_registry" |
+            python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["token"])')
+          ( umask 077; printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$tok" > "$tmp/bearer.cfg" )
+          digest=$(curl -fsS -I -K "$tmp/bearer.cfg" \
+            -H 'Accept: application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json, application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.list.v2+json, application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json, application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json' \
+            "https://${REGISTRY}/v2/${IMAGE_PATH}/manifests/${tag}" | tr -d '\r' |
+            awk -F': ' 'tolower($1)=="docker-content-digest"{print $2}')
+          [[ "$digest" =~ ^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]] || { echo "::error::no digest for ${IMAGE_PATH}:${tag}"; exit 1; }
+          ref="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}@${digest}"
+          printf '%s\n' "$COSIGN_KEY_PEM" > "$tmp/cosign.key"; chmod 600 "$tmp/cosign.key"
+          "$bin" sign --yes --key "$tmp/cosign.key" --tlog-upload=false \
+            --new-bundle-format=false --use-signing-config=false "$ref"
+          "$bin" public-key --key "$tmp/cosign.key" > "$tmp/cosign.pub"
+          "$bin" verify --key "$tmp/cosign.pub" --insecure-ignore-tlog "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}:${tag}@${digest}" >/dev/null
+          echo "✓ signed and verified ${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}:${tag}@${digest}"
+
+      - name: Summary
+        run: |
+          if [ "${{ steps.meta.outputs.push }}" = "true" ]; then
+            echo "published ${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.tag }} (amd64+arm64), toolchain asserted on both"
+          else
+            echo "validation only — the Dockerfile builds on both arches; nothing published"
+          fi

.github/workflows/build-image.yml

@@ -101,6 +101,30 @@ jobs:
       #
       # Asserted on BOTH architectures, because a package that resolves on amd64
       # and not on arm64 would otherwise reach half the nodes unnoticed.
+      #
+      # openssl and jq were added after this check already existed and still
+      # missed them: the release tag gate shells out to both to verify the
+      # Control Plane's signed quorum verdict, and their absence surfaced as
+      # "verdict not signed" / "signature FAILED verification" rather than as a
+      # missing tool, blocking v0.0.134 and v0.0.135. The list only covers what
+      # someone remembered to add, so add to it whenever a gate grows a new
+      # shell dependency.
+      #
+      # DERIVED once, 2026-08-31, rather than remembered: every command invoked
+      # from a `run:` block across zegit's Gitea-executed workflows and its
+      # composite actions was extracted and checked against this list. Result:
+      # no missing apk package. Everything resolved to one of three sources —
+      # baked in here; provided by busybox/coreutils; or downloaded per-run and
+      # immediately version-checked (go via setup-go, buildctl, flux, cosign,
+      # syft, goreleaser). The download path needs nothing from this image
+      # beyond curl and tar, both already asserted.
+      #
+      # What the audit DID find is that the busybox/coreutils layer was entirely
+      # unasserted, so dropping `coreutils` from the apk line above would pass
+      # this check while base64, mktemp, seq and sort silently vanished — and by
+      # the history above, their absence would be narrated as whatever the gate
+      # using them happened to be doing. They are asserted below now. They are
+      # cheap to check and the failure they prevent is expensive to read.
       - name: Verify the image still contains the toolchain the gates need
         if: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.push == 'true' }}
         run: |
@@ -119,6 +143,13 @@ jobs:
               command -v make     >/dev/null && echo "make=ok"     || echo "make=MISSING"
               command -v curl     >/dev/null && echo "curl=ok"     || echo "curl=MISSING"
               command -v tar      >/dev/null && echo "tar=ok"      || echo "tar=MISSING"
+              command -v openssl  >/dev/null && echo "openssl=ok"  || echo "openssl=MISSING"
+              command -v jq       >/dev/null && echo "jq=ok"       || echo "jq=MISSING"
+              # busybox/coreutils layer: used across zegit's gates for base64
+              # decoding of DSSE payloads, temp dirs, poll loops and sorting.
+              for t in base64 mktemp seq sort sed grep cut head wc uname date; do
+                command -v "$t" >/dev/null && echo "$t=ok" || echo "$t=MISSING"
+              done
               [ -x "$(git --exec-path)/git-http-backend" ] \
                 && echo "git-http-backend=ok" || echo "git-http-backend=MISSING"
             ' 2>&1) || { echo "::error::could not run $REF on $plat"; fail=1; continue; }

Dockerfile

@@ -20,7 +20,27 @@
 # forgejo-runner-system -- github-registry-credentials for ghcr.io. An earlier
 # version of this comment claimed the package was public and needed no secret;
 # that was wrong for the Gitea registry too, which is private.
-FROM code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner:12.11.1
+# The runner binary is built from upstream v12.11.1 with one patch: Gitea 28 adds
+# job-index and job-total under `strategy` in the workflow it sends for a matrix
+# job, and the stock schema refuses them ("Unknown Property job-total ... the
+# workflow file is not usable"), so every matrix job dies before its first step.
+# No forgejo-runner release accepts them (checked through 13.2.1). Drop this stage
+# when upstream does, or when the runner is replaced.
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM data.forgejo.org/oci/golang:1.25-alpine3.23@sha256:27b3069b25647beacd3745b0b2c83e2f9b8d3935455a32cd4531236ee1c960e0 AS runner-build
+ARG TARGETOS
+ARG TARGETARCH
+RUN apk add --no-cache git
+ADD --keep-git-dir=false https://code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner.git#8e01d43cd27e0732a1cff664996a92739472d42b /srv
+COPY patches/ /patches/
+WORKDIR /srv
+RUN git apply --verbose /patches/*.patch
+# The patch's own tests, so a build cannot ship a patch that stopped working.
+RUN go test -count=1 ./act/schema/ ./internal/app/run/ -run 'StrategyJobIndexAndTotal|Gitea28MatrixJob'
+RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS="$TARGETOS" GOARCH="$TARGETARCH" go build -trimpath -tags 'netgo osusergo' \
+      -ldflags '-s -w -X code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner/v12/internal/pkg/ver.version=v12.11.1' \
+      -o /out/forgejo-runner .
+
+FROM code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner:12.11.1@sha256:a1a2885261a0b8337d4791dd6949651117206741ba66423c24a57c107a64d4a8
 
 USER root
 
@@ -38,6 +58,38 @@ USER root
 # curl,tar -> setup-go / gitleaks download + extract their own arch-specific binaries
 # make     -> zegit Makefile targets
 # ca-certificates -> trusted roots for HTTPS to gitea/github/goproxy
+# openssl  -> the release tag gate verifies the Control Plane's SIGNED quorum
+#             verdict (Ed25519 DSSE) with `openssl pkeyutl -verify -rawin`.
+#             Absent, that command failed "command not found" and the gate's
+#             `|| { echo ...; exit 1; }` reported it as "Quorum verdict
+#             signature FAILED verification" -- a TOOLING gap narrated as a
+#             SECURITY verdict, pointing the investigation at a perfectly
+#             valid signed approval instead of at this image. It blocked
+#             v0.0.134 and v0.0.135 on 2026-08-31.
+# jq       -> the same story one step earlier: the gate parsed that envelope
+#             with `jq -e`, and a missing jq was reported as "not a signed
+#             DSSE envelope". jq is the reflex tool for JSON in shell steps,
+#             so its absence keeps resurfacing as a misleading failure in
+#             whichever step reaches for it next.
+# gcc,musl-dev -> C toolchain for cgo; `go test -race` (the Makefile test
+#             target) requires cgo, which needs a C compiler + libc headers
+#             (musl on Alpine)
+# python3,py3-yaml -> the repo's own gates are Python: credentials-coverage.sh,
+#             validate-admission.sh and feature-lint.sh all shell out to
+#             python3, and credentials-coverage parses manifests with yaml
+#
+# chromium, font-noto -> the browser gates (2026-09-08): zegit's `browser
+#             tests` (chromedp + a CDP virtual authenticator over the WebAuthn
+#             ceremony pages) and `lighthouse` (treosh/lighthouse-ci-action
+#             via chrome-launcher) were github.com-only jobs, so when `ci`
+#             was routed to this runner on 2026-08-31 they stopped running
+#             anywhere. chromedp finds `chromium`/`chromium-browser` on PATH;
+#             chrome-launcher honours CHROME_PATH. font-noto so text renders
+#             (an empty font set makes layout/contrast audits meaningless).
+# postgresql-client -> `psql`, so the lighthouse job can CREATE/DROP its own
+#             database on the runner's ci-postgres (ZEGIT_TESTPG_DSN) instead
+#             of migrating the shared maintenance database from under the
+#             integration suite's template.
 #
 # Go is intentionally NOT baked in: actions/setup-go fetches the pinned version
 # per-run (node + tar are present), so the image needs no rebuild on Go bumps.
@@ -50,7 +102,31 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache \
       curl \
       tar \
       make \
-      ca-certificates
+      ca-certificates \
+      gcc \
+      musl-dev \
+      python3 \
+      py3-yaml \
+      openssl \
+      jq \
+      chromium \
+      font-noto \
+      postgresql-client
+
+# CVE-2026-111497 (brotli decoder out-of-bounds write, CISA KEV, due 2026-11-10): the
+# forgejo/runner:12.11.1 base ships brotli-libs 1.2.0-r0, and `apk add` above never
+# upgrades a package the base already has. git-remote-http and curl link it through
+# libcurl. Upgrade it explicitly and fail the build if it is still behind, so a base
+# bump can never quietly bring the vulnerable version back. Drop this once the upstream
+# runner base ships brotli-libs >= 1.2.1.
+RUN set -eux; \
+    apk upgrade --no-cache brotli-libs; \
+    v="$(apk list --installed brotli-libs | sed -n 's/^brotli-libs-\([0-9][^ ]*\) .*/\1/p')"; \
+    echo "brotli-libs ${v}"; \
+    [ "$(apk version -t "${v}" 1.2.1-r0)" != "<" ] || { echo "brotli-libs ${v} is older than 1.2.1-r0 (CVE-2026-111497)"; exit 1; }
+
+# The patched binary replaces the stock one (see the runner-build stage).
+COPY --from=runner-build /out/forgejo-runner /bin/forgejo-runner
 
 # Match the runner pod's runAsUser (1000); keep the image non-root by default.
 USER 1000

patches/0001-accept-gitea28-strategy-job-index-total.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,687 @@
+diff --git a/act/schema/schema_test.go b/act/schema/schema_test.go
+index 14daa46..6be5075 100644
+--- a/act/schema/schema_test.go
++++ b/act/schema/schema_test.go
+@@ -571,3 +571,30 @@ jobs:
+ 		})
+ 	}
+ }
++
++func TestSchema_StrategyJobIndexAndTotal(t *testing.T) {
++	for _, value := range []string{"1", "${{ vars.N }}"} {
++		var node yaml.Node
++		err := yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(`
++on: [push]
++jobs:
++  test1:
++    runs-on: docker
++    strategy:
++      matrix:
++        image: [a]
++      job-index: `+value+`
++      job-total: `+value+`
++    steps:
++      - run: echo All good!
++`), &node)
++		if !assert.NoError(t, err) {
++			return
++		}
++		err = (&Node{
++			Definition: "workflow-root",
++			Schema:     GetWorkflowSchema(),
++		}).UnmarshalYAML(&node)
++		assert.NoError(t, err, value)
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/act/schema/workflow_schema.json b/act/schema/workflow_schema.json
+index 67ffbde..99bdcc8 100644
+--- a/act/schema/workflow_schema.json
++++ b/act/schema/workflow_schema.json
+@@ -1573,7 +1573,15 @@
+             "type": "max-parallel",
+             "description": "The maximum number of jobs that can run simultaneously when using a matrix job strategy. By default, GitHub will maximize the number of jobs run in parallel depending on runner availability."
+           },
+-          "matrix": "matrix"
++          "matrix": "matrix",
++          "job-index": {
++            "type": "max-parallel",
++            "description": "Set by Gitea 28 on each job of an expanded matrix; the runner ignores it."
++          },
++          "job-total": {
++            "type": "max-parallel",
++            "description": "Set by Gitea 28 on each job of an expanded matrix; the runner ignores it."
++          }
+         }
+       }
+     },
+diff --git a/internal/app/run/testdata/gitea28-matrix-job.yml b/internal/app/run/testdata/gitea28-matrix-job.yml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6267e24
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/internal/app/run/testdata/gitea28-matrix-job.yml
+@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
++name: image-gitea
++'on':
++  push:
++    branches: ["claude/**"] # PoC trigger; tags come in P2
++    tags: ["v*"]
++  workflow_dispatch:
++env:
++  BUILDKIT_HOST: tcp://buildkitd.buildkit-system.svc.cluster.local:1234
++  BUILDKIT_VERSION: v0.32.2
++  REGISTRY: gitea.langenoja.se
++  # zegit publishes under a registry owner of its own, written only by the
++  # operator and the restricted CI user zegit-ci (RUNBOOK-TENANT-PACKAGES.md
++  # §3 option A). The Control Plane's image_path_prefix for zegit-zoo/zegit is
++  # ${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}/, so it signs nothing anywhere else. Releases
++  # before this owner are under zegit-zoo/zegit; scripts/image-path-of.sh
++  # reads a tag's IMAGE_PATH from that tag's own copy of this file.
++  IMAGE_PATH: zegit-packages/zegit
++  # The account ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN is minted on. Gitea authenticates the
++  # token's own account whatever name is sent (RUNBOOK-TENANT-PACKAGES.md §4),
++  # so the login names the owner it actually is.
++  REGISTRY_USER: zegit-ci
++jobs:
++  build:
++    name: build z-gateway-server (buildkit)
++    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
++    if: always()
++    steps:
++      - if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
++        name: End processes left behind by earlier jobs (zegit#137)
++        run: |
++          /usr/bin/python3 -I -S - --job-env <<'QUARANTINE'
++          #!/usr/bin/env python3
++          """runner-quarantine — end every process a previous job left behind (zegit#137).
++
++          The self-hosted Forgejo runner is host-mode: every job a runner pod takes
++          runs as the same uid in the same process namespace. A branch job can leave a
++          detached process behind (`setsid nohup implant &`) that outlives its job and
++          reads /proc/<pid>/environ and /proc/<pid>/cmdline of every later job on the
++          pod — the signer tokens of a release build included. The lasting fix is an
++          ephemeral, repository-scoped runner for the signing jobs (operator steps in
++          documentation/CI-ON-GITEA.md §11); this is the in-job stopgap.
++
++          It runs as the FIRST step of every job that holds a signing credential —
++          before actions/checkout — and from the workflow text, not the workspace: the
++          workflow file comes from the server, while the checkout (and anything run
++          from it) is writable by the very process this ends. Each such step is
++          `/usr/bin/python3 -I -S - --job-env <<'QUARANTINE'` followed by this file
++          verbatim (-I -S: no user site, no usercustomize/sitecustomize, no PYTHON*
++          environment from the shared $HOME). scripts/workflow-policy.py checks that
++          every copy is byte-identical to this file; `workflow-policy.py
++          --print-quarantine-step` prints the step to paste.
++
++          --job-env then gives the job a private HOME under RUNNER_TEMP (0700, an
++          empty .gitconfig) and exports HOME, XDG_CONFIG_HOME, XDG_CACHE_HOME,
++          GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL and GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1 through GITHUB_ENV, so no git
++          call of the job (actions/checkout's included) reads a ~/.gitconfig
++          (core.fsmonitor, core.hooksPath) or other dotfile an earlier job planted in
++          the runner's shared $HOME.
++
++          A runner is capacity-1, so while this job runs nothing else of this uid
++          belongs on the pod except this job's own process ancestry (act_runner and the
++          step shell). Every other process of this uid is stopped (SIGSTOP, so it can
++          not fork away while we look), then killed (SIGKILL), and the scan repeats
++          until nothing is left. A survivor after ROUNDS rounds fails the step.
++
++          Each process ended is named on a ::warning:: line by pid, name and parent —
++          never its command line, which may itself hold a credential.
++
++          Refuses to run against the real /proc anywhere but a Gitea/Forgejo Actions
++          job: on a workstation "every other process of my uid" is the whole session.
++          --proc points it at a fixture tree for the tests (scripts/test-workflow-policy.sh).
++          """
++          import argparse
++          import os
++          import signal
++          import sys
++          import tempfile
++          import time
++
++          ROUNDS = 10
++
++
++          def read_status(proc, pid):
++              """Return (name, ppid, uid, state) or None when the process is gone."""
++              try:
++                  with open(os.path.join(proc, pid, "status")) as f:
++                      text = f.read()
++              except OSError:
++                  return None
++              fields = {}
++              for line in text.splitlines():
++                  key, _, value = line.partition(":")
++                  fields[key.strip()] = value.strip()
++              try:
++                  name = fields.get("Name", "?")
++                  ppid = int(fields["PPid"])
++                  uid = int(fields["Uid"].split()[0])
++                  state = fields.get("State", "R").split()[0]
++              except (KeyError, ValueError, IndexError):
++                  return None
++              return name, ppid, uid, state
++
++
++          def snapshot(proc):
++              procs = {}
++              try:
++                  entries = os.listdir(proc)
++              except OSError as e:
++                  sys.exit(f"::error::runner-quarantine: cannot list {proc}: {e}")
++              for entry in entries:
++                  if not entry.isdigit():
++                      continue
++                  st = read_status(proc, entry)
++                  if st is not None:
++                      procs[int(entry)] = st
++              return procs
++
++
++          def ancestry(procs, self_pid):
++              chain = set()
++              pid = self_pid
++              while pid > 0 and pid not in chain:
++                  chain.add(pid)
++                  st = procs.get(pid)
++                  if st is None:
++                      break
++                  pid = st[1]
++              return chain
++
++
++          def strays(proc, self_pid, uid):
++              procs = snapshot(proc)
++              keep = ancestry(procs, self_pid) | {1}
++              return {
++                  pid: st for pid, st in procs.items()
++                  if st[2] == uid and pid not in keep and st[3] not in ("Z", "X")
++              }
++
++
++          def signal_all(pids, sig):
++              for pid in pids:
++                  try:
++                      os.kill(pid, sig)
++                  except ProcessLookupError:
++                      pass
++                  except PermissionError as e:
++                      print(f"::warning::runner-quarantine: cannot signal pid {pid}: {e}")
++
++
++          def job_env():
++              """A private HOME for the rest of the job; returns its path."""
++              temp = os.environ.get("RUNNER_TEMP", "")
++              env_file = os.environ.get("GITHUB_ENV", "")
++              if not temp or not env_file:
++                  sys.exit("::error::runner-quarantine: --job-env needs RUNNER_TEMP and GITHUB_ENV")
++              home = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="job-home.", dir=temp)  # 0700
++              for sub in (".config", ".cache"):
++                  os.mkdir(os.path.join(home, sub), 0o700)
++              gitconfig = os.path.join(home, ".gitconfig")
++              with open(gitconfig, "x"):
++                  pass
++              values = {
++                  "HOME": home,
++                  "XDG_CONFIG_HOME": os.path.join(home, ".config"),
++                  "XDG_CACHE_HOME": os.path.join(home, ".cache"),
++                  "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": gitconfig,
++                  "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": "1",
++              }
++              with open(env_file, "a") as f:
++                  for key, value in values.items():
++                      f.write(f"{key}={value}\n")
++              return home
++
++
++          def main():
++              ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0])
++              ap.add_argument("--proc", default="/proc", help="procfs root (a fixture tree in tests)")
++              ap.add_argument("--self", type=int, default=os.getpid(), dest="self_pid",
++                              help="the pid whose ancestry is this job (default: this process)")
++              ap.add_argument("--uid", type=int, default=os.getuid(), help="the job's uid (default: this process's)")
++              ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true", help="name the strays, signal nothing")
++              ap.add_argument("--job-env", action="store_true",
++                              help="after a clean quarantine, export a private HOME and git config via GITHUB_ENV")
++              args = ap.parse_args()
++
++              if args.proc == "/proc":
++                  on_runner = os.environ.get("GITHUB_ACTIONS") == "true"
++                  server = os.environ.get("GITHUB_SERVER_URL", "")
++                  if not on_runner or server in ("", "https://github.com"):
++                      print("runner-quarantine: refusing — only a self-hosted Gitea/Forgejo Actions job may end "
++                            "every other process of its uid (GITHUB_ACTIONS=true and a non-github.com "
++                            "GITHUB_SERVER_URL); use --proc for a fixture.", file=sys.stderr)
++                      return 2
++
++              rc = quarantine(args)
++              if rc == 0 and args.job_env:
++                  print(f"runner-quarantine: private HOME {job_env()}; git reads no global or system config")
++              return rc
++
++
++          def quarantine(args):
++              found = strays(args.proc, args.self_pid, args.uid)
++              if not found:
++                  print(f"runner-quarantine: no process of uid {args.uid} outside this job's ancestry")
++                  return 0
++              for pid, (name, ppid, _, _) in sorted(found.items()):
++                  print(f"::warning::runner-quarantine: pid {pid} ({name}, parent {ppid}) of uid {args.uid} "
++                        f"is not part of this job — a process left behind by an earlier job")
++              if args.dry_run:
++                  print(f"runner-quarantine: dry run — {len(found)} stray process(es), none signalled")
++                  return 0
++
++              ended = set()
++              for _ in range(ROUNDS):
++                  pids = sorted(found)
++                  ended.update(pids)
++                  signal_all(pids, signal.SIGSTOP)
++                  signal_all(pids, signal.SIGKILL)
++                  time.sleep(0.2)
++                  found = strays(args.proc, args.self_pid, args.uid)
++                  if not found:
++                      print(f"runner-quarantine: ended {len(ended)} stray process(es); none left")
++                      return 0
++              names = ", ".join(f"{pid} ({st[0]})" for pid, st in sorted(found.items()))
++              print(f"::error::runner-quarantine: processes of uid {args.uid} survive {ROUNDS} rounds of SIGKILL: "
++                    f"{names}. This job holds a signing credential and does not run beside them.")
++              return 1
++
++
++          if __name__ == "__main__":
++              sys.exit(main())
++          QUARANTINE
++        shell: bash
++      - if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && vars.ZEGIT_SIGNING_RUNNER != '' }}
++        name: Warn when the signing-runner fallback is set (zegit#137)
++        run: echo "::warning::vars.ZEGIT_SIGNING_RUNNER is set to '${FALLBACK}', so this job runs there instead of on the isolated zegit-signing runner. That re-opens zegit#137 until the variable is deleted (documentation/CI-ON-GITEA.md section 11)."
++        env:
++          FALLBACK: ${{ vars.ZEGIT_SIGNING_RUNNER }}
++        continue-on-error: true
++      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1
++        with:
++          fetch-depth: 0
++          persist-credentials: false
++      - name: Configure private modules from the Gitea mirror (job-scoped)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/gitea-module-auth
++        with:
++          token: ${{ secrets.ZEGIT_CI_READ_TOKEN }}
++      - name: Go toolchain and caches of this job only (sha256-pinned)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/isolated-go
++      - name: go mod download + verify, then vendor (the Dockerfiles build from vendor/)
++        run: |
++          set -euo pipefail
++          go version
++          go mod download
++          go mod verify
++          go mod vendor
++      - name: Private work directory (zegit#138)
++        run: |
++          set -euo pipefail
++          work=$(mktemp -d "${RUNNER_TEMP}/image.XXXXXX")
++          chmod 700 "$work"
++          echo "IMAGE_WORK=$work" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
++      - name: Install buildctl (workspace-local; runner is non-root)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-tool
++        with:
++          name: buildctl
++          extract: bin/buildctl
++          url-amd64: https://github.com/moby/buildkit/releases/download/${{ env.BUILDKIT_VERSION }}/buildkit-${{ env.BUILDKIT_VERSION }}.linux-amd64.tar.gz
++          url-arm64: https://github.com/moby/buildkit/releases/download/${{ env.BUILDKIT_VERSION }}/buildkit-${{ env.BUILDKIT_VERSION }}.linux-arm64.tar.gz
++          sha256-amd64: 2975d0f651ad96ba8b80b9992ae1f9a964f4408569af5b6dc36544165c3926af
++          sha256-arm64: 9e8f46bf309ec0ab262967be5538a4dbe06be756a82621f98253933bac5dcf92
++      - name: buildkitd reachable (mTLS via the sidecar; deny-by-default otherwise)
++        run: |
++          buildctl --version
++          buildctl debug workers
++      - id: meta
++        name: Determine version and build time
++        run: |
++          if [[ "$REF_TYPE" == "tag" ]]; then version="$REF_NAME"; else version="$GITHUB_SHA"; fi
++          echo "version=$version" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
++          echo "build_time=$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
++        env:
++          REF_TYPE: ${{ github.ref_type }}
++          REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
++      - if: ${{ matrix.image == 'z-backend' }}
++        name: Verify and bake the commit's AoV into the image
++        run: bash scripts/bake-aov.sh "$SHA" cmd/z-backend/buildaov/aov.json
++        env:
++          SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
++          # zegit#185: revocations from the Control Plane, and the root
++          # pinned outside the tree (an owner-set repository variable).
++          CP_URL: https://zegit.io
++          ZEGIT_AOV_ROOT_SHA256: ${{ vars.ZEGIT_AOV_ROOT_SHA256 }}
++      - name: Build (multi-arch) to an OCI archive
++        run: |
++          set -euo pipefail
++          # BuildKit's OCI-layout exporter writes INTO an existing directory,
++          # and run 4909 (2026-09-03) scanned blobs an earlier build left in a
++          # shared /tmp path: the log showed openssh 10.3_p1-r1 being installed
++          # while trivy reported r0 from the stale layout. The layout now lives
++          # in this job's own IMAGE_WORK, and the index is still proven to be
++          # the one this build just wrote.
++          oci="${IMAGE_WORK}/oci"
++          stamp=$(mktemp "${IMAGE_WORK}/stamp.XXXXXX")
++          buildctl build --progress=plain \
++            --frontend dockerfile.v0 \
++            --local context=. \
++            --local dockerfile="cmd/${IMAGE}" \
++            --opt platform=linux/amd64,linux/arm64 \
++            --opt build-arg:VERSION="${VERSION}" \
++            --opt build-arg:COMMIT="${{ github.sha }}" \
++            --opt build-arg:BUILD_TIME="${BUILD_TIME}" \
++            --output "type=oci,tar=false,dest=${oci},name=${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}/${IMAGE}:${{ github.sha }}-gitea"
++          if [[ ! "${oci}/index.json" -nt "$stamp" ]]; then
++            echo "::error::${oci}/index.json was not written by this build — refusing to scan a stale layout"; exit 1
++          fi
++          du -sh "$oci"; head -c 400 "${oci}/index.json"; echo
++        env:
++          IMAGE: ${{ matrix.image }}
++          VERSION: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}
++          BUILD_TIME: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.build_time }}
++      - name: Install trivy (workspace-local)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-tool
++        with:
++          name: trivy
++          extract: trivy
++          url-amd64: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v0.74.0/trivy_0.74.0_Linux-64bit.tar.gz
++          url-arm64: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v0.74.0/trivy_0.74.0_Linux-ARM64.tar.gz
++          sha256-amd64: 2ae6fe3ee734b7fdf11335663e18c75ea12dccc76062f09f164a3b0f8be4371a
++          sha256-arm64: b94ce1976bbf3c15b514b605ee88be7c6d94a29be2302847ff01cb794d47aad5
++      - name: Scan the archive (trivy, fail on fixable HIGH/CRITICAL)
++        run: |
++          # An OCI layout DIRECTORY (buildkit type=oci,tar=false); the multi-arch
++          # index needs an explicit platform. The tarball form failed to
++          # initialise on the first run (2026-08-29).
++          trivy --version
++          # The vulnerability DB is the one network fetch left in a tag build.
++          # Run 5332 (v0.0.147, 2026-09-04) died on it — mirror.gcr.io answered
++          # BLOB_UNKNOWN and ghcr.io DENIED for the same minute — and the agent
++          # token cannot re-run a job, so a transient refusal cost an operator
++          # click. Fetch it once before scanning. Each source is tried on its
++          # own (trivy's comma chain stops at the first DENIED, #76) and the
++          # whole list is retried in rounds with a pause between them; the loop
++          # lives in scripts/trivy-db-download.sh, shared with the rescan.
++          bash scripts/trivy-db-download.sh
++          trivy image --input "${IMAGE_WORK}/oci" --platform linux/amd64 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --ignore-unfixed --exit-code 1 --format table --scanners vuln --skip-db-update
++          trivy image --input "${IMAGE_WORK}/oci" --platform linux/amd64 --severity MEDIUM,HIGH,CRITICAL --exit-code 0 --format table --scanners vuln --skip-db-update
++        env:
++          IMAGE: ${{ matrix.image }}
++      - name: Install crane (workspace-local)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-tool
++        with:
++          name: crane
++          extract: crane
++          url-amd64: https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.21.7/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz
++          url-arm64: https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.21.7/go-containerregistry_Linux_arm64.tar.gz
++          sha256-amd64: 1a57bc98207fa1c0d04bf760699099e26f8383499bfd55b99c1b919a928a7230
++          sha256-arm64: b6ee979d9411dfb05ce35ab9e156fe5de7def11a230764a7856ffa2eb971fa88
++      - id: push
++        name: Push the scanned layout to the Gitea registry (when a package-write token is present)
++        run: |
++          set -euo pipefail
++          if [[ -z "${TOKEN}" ]]; then
++            if [[ "${RELEASE}" == "true" ]]; then
++              echo "::error::ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN is not set, so this release tag built an image and pushed nothing. A v* run must produce the artefact it claims. Issue a package-write token and store it as this secret."
++              exit 1
++            fi
++            echo "no ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN — build-only run (not pushed)"; exit 0
++          fi
++          mkdir -p "$HOME/.docker"
++          printf '{"auths":{"%s":{"auth":"%s"}}}\n' "$REGISTRY" "$(printf '%s:%s' "$REGISTRY_USER" "$TOKEN" | base64 -w0)" > "$HOME/.docker/config.json"
++          ref="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}/${IMAGE}:${{ github.sha }}-gitea"
++          # The layout's top-level index.json names exactly one manifest: the
++          # multi-arch image index buildkit wrote. That digest is what trivy
++          # scanned; it must be what the registry ends up holding. crane
++          # pushes index.json itself as the tagged manifest, which would nest
++          # an index inside an index — Gitea's registry answers MANIFEST_INVALID
++          # to that (run 8203, 2026-09-17) — so promote the image index blob to
++          # index.json first: the bytes crane then pushes ARE that blob, and
++          # the digest the registry computes is the one trivy scanned.
++          oci="${IMAGE_WORK}/oci"
++          scanned=$(python3 -I -c 'import json,sys; ms=json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["manifests"]; assert len(ms)==1, ms; print(ms[0]["digest"])' "${oci}/index.json")
++          cp "${oci}/blobs/sha256/${scanned#sha256:}" "${oci}/index.json"
++          [[ "sha256:$(sha256sum "${oci}/index.json" | cut -d' ' -f1)" == "$scanned" ]] || { echo "::error::index.json is not the scanned image index"; exit 1; }
++          crane version
++          crane push --index "$oci" "$ref"
++          pushed=$(crane digest "$ref")
++          if [[ "$pushed" != "$scanned" ]]; then
++            echo "::error::pushed index digest ${pushed} is not the scanned layout's ${scanned} — the registry does not hold the bytes trivy passed. Refusing to sign."
++            exit 1
++          fi
++          echo "pushed digest: ${pushed} (identical to the scanned layout)"
++          echo "digest=${pushed}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
++        env:
++          IMAGE: ${{ matrix.image }}
++          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN }}
++          RELEASE: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
++      - if: always()
++        name: Remove the scanned OCI layout (host-mode runner; the disk persists)
++        run: |
++          [ -z "${IMAGE_WORK:-}" ] || rm -rf "${IMAGE_WORK}/oci"
++      - name: Install cosign (workspace-local)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-tool
++        with:
++          name: cosign
++          url-amd64: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v3.1.3/cosign-linux-amd64
++          url-arm64: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v3.1.3/cosign-linux-arm64
++          sha256-amd64: 4629c757b7618056f8ddd7e2625ae9fdd94c0372a65049520bc7d9df9efc7f71
++          sha256-arm64: c5d324e091826b0d7a78eb16fef316450b4eb9aaec045611c08ba06f5e73220a
++      - name: Install oras (workspace-local)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-tool
++        with:
++          name: oras
++          extract: oras
++          url-amd64: https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.3.4/oras_1.3.4_linux_amd64.tar.gz
++          url-arm64: https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.3.4/oras_1.3.4_linux_arm64.tar.gz
++          sha256-amd64: f27adb935022d94df8dc77719c322dda592c78a0d57a6f7dcdd8d900b248c454
++          sha256-arm64: 15702c6e3a4a56a8bd8ac5c17efdbcab56d9bada661ccbcf017f5b10c1d89399
++      - name: Install syft (workspace-local)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/fetch-tool
++        with:
++          name: syft
++          extract: syft
++          url-amd64: https://github.com/anchore/syft/releases/download/v1.51.1/syft_1.51.1_linux_amd64.tar.gz
++          url-arm64: https://github.com/anchore/syft/releases/download/v1.51.1/syft_1.51.1_linux_arm64.tar.gz
++          sha256-amd64: 8fcb33017a0dc1058298c923c436d19dfa68ae93968e0b423248542e3afb9fc3
++          sha256-arm64: a7fd2b784e6664acd44719270574f6cd8c6864fc2b1700bf9099bd1cccda7d7f
++      - name: Sign with the Control Plane keystore and attach
++        run: |
++          set -euo pipefail
++          if [[ "${RELEASE}" == "true" ]]; then
++            TOKEN="${RELEASE_TOKEN}" SIGN_PATH=/internal/signing/image KEY_PATH=/signing/image-key TOKEN_NAME=ZEGIT_CI_IMAGE_SIGNER_TOKEN PINS="${IMAGE_KEY_PINS}" PIN_FILE=deployment/keys/image-key.pem
++          else
++            TOKEN="${TRIAL_TOKEN}" SIGN_PATH=/internal/signing/image-trial KEY_PATH=/signing/image-trial-key TOKEN_NAME=ZEGIT_CI_IMAGE_TRIAL_SIGNER_TOKEN PINS="${IMAGE_TRIAL_KEY_PINS}" PIN_FILE=deployment/keys/image-trial-key.pem
++          fi
++          if [[ -z "${TOKEN}" || -z "${DIGEST}" ]]; then
++            if [[ "${RELEASE}" == "true" ]]; then
++              # if/else, not `test && assign`: a false `&&` returns non-zero and
++              # `set -e` would kill the step before it printed the error.
++              if [[ -n "${TOKEN}" ]]; then missing="a pushed digest"; else missing="ZEGIT_CI_IMAGE_SIGNER_TOKEN"; fi
++              echo "::error::No ${missing}, so this release image is unsigned. Flux and admission verify the Control Plane's image-signing key, so an unsigned v* image would be refused by the cluster — failing here is the readable failure. Issue a signer-scoped forward token and store it as ZEGIT_CI_IMAGE_SIGNER_TOKEN."
++              exit 1
++            fi
++            echo "no ${TOKEN_NAME} or no pushed digest — not signed"; exit 0
++          fi
++          ref="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}/${IMAGE}@${DIGEST}"
++          # The tag rides INSIDE the signed payload (cosign's payload names the
++          # repository only). The Control Plane reads it to require a met Tag
++          # Request quorum for a v* tag before signing; a branch/trial tag
++          # (<sha>-gitea) signs without one. The v*-gitea tag itself is written
++          # only after this signature verifies (see the tag step below).
++          # zegit#138: every file of the exchange lives in a fresh 0700
++          # directory, never a fixed /tmp path another job could swap between
++          # two of these lines, and the payload is checked to name exactly the
++          # pushed digest BEFORE the Control Plane signs it (a signature over
++          # any other digest would spend this tag's one signing slot).
++          # The payload is read ONCE, into a variable: the bytes checked, the
++          # bytes sent and the bytes attached are all decoded from it, and the
++          # attached file is compared with it again right before attaching.
++          sign=$(mktemp -d "${IMAGE_WORK}/sign.XXXXXX")
++          payload_b64=$(cosign generate -a "tag=${VERSION}-gitea" "$ref" | base64 -w0)
++          printf '%s' "$payload_b64" | base64 -d > "$sign/checked.json"
++          bash scripts/signing-payload.sh check "$sign/checked.json" "$DIGEST"
++          # The bearer reaches curl as a config on a pipe, never on its
++          # command line (/proc/<pid>/cmdline is world-readable; zegit#139).
++          curl -fsS -X POST "${CP_URL}${SIGN_PATH}" -K <(printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$TOKEN") -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
++            -d "{\"payload\":\"${payload_b64}\"}" > "$sign/sign.json"
++          python3 -I -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["signature"])' "$sign/sign.json" > "$sign/sig.b64"
++          # Re-checked after the round trip: still the signed bytes, still the digest.
++          cmp -s "$sign/checked.json" <(printf '%s' "$payload_b64" | base64 -d) \
++            || { echo "::error::the payload file changed after it was signed — not attaching"; exit 1; }
++          bash scripts/signing-payload.sh check "$sign/checked.json" "$DIGEST"
++          # The same .sig artifact `cosign attach signature` wrote, byte for
++          # byte; cosign v4 removes that command (zegit#39).
++          bash scripts/attach-signature.sh "$ref" "$sign/checked.json" "$sign/sig.b64"
++          curl -fsS "${CP_URL}${KEY_PATH}" > "$sign/image-key.pem"
++          bash scripts/check-key-pin.sh "$sign/image-key.pem" "${PINS}" "${KEY_PATH#/signing/}" "${PIN_FILE}"
++          cosign verify --key "$sign/image-key.pem" --insecure-ignore-tlog "$ref" >/dev/null && echo "verified with the Control Plane's ${KEY_PATH#/signing/} key"
++        env:
++          IMAGE: ${{ matrix.image }}
++          DIGEST: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}
++          RELEASE: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
++          RELEASE_TOKEN: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && secrets.ZEGIT_CI_IMAGE_SIGNER_TOKEN || '' }}
++          TRIAL_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.ZEGIT_CI_IMAGE_TRIAL_SIGNER_TOKEN }}
++          VERSION: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}
++          CP_URL: https://zegit.io
++          # zegit#141, #187: the served key must be the one committed under
++          # deployment/keys/ (reviewable in git; scripts/check-key-pin.sh
++          # refuses without a pin). These repository variables are an
++          # OVERRIDE of that pin (fingerprints, comma-separated during a
++          # rotation); leave them unset.
++          IMAGE_KEY_PINS: ${{ vars.ZEGIT_IMAGE_KEY_SHA256 }}
++          IMAGE_TRIAL_KEY_PINS: ${{ vars.ZEGIT_IMAGE_TRIAL_KEY_SHA256 }}
++      - if: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest != '' }}
++        name: Generate and attach an SPDX SBOM per platform (syft, unsigned referrer)
++        run: |
++          set -euo pipefail
++          syft version
++          bash scripts/image-sbom.sh "${REGISTRY}" "${IMAGE_PATH}/${IMAGE}" "${DIGEST}" "${IMAGE_WORK}/sbom"
++          {
++            echo "### SBOMs — \`${IMAGE}\` @ ${DIGEST}"
++            echo
++            for f in "${IMAGE_WORK}"/sbom/*.spdx.json; do
++              echo "- $(basename "$f"): $(python3 -I -c 'import json,sys; print(len(json.load(open(sys.argv[1])).get("packages", [])))' "$f") packages (attached with oras as cosign's .sbom artifact, unsigned)"
++            done
++          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
++        env:
++          IMAGE: ${{ matrix.image }}
++          DIGEST: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}
++      - if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.push.outputs.digest == '' }}
++        name: Require the SBOM on a release
++        run: |
++          echo "::error::no pushed digest, so no SBOM could be generated or attached for this release image."
++          exit 1
++      - if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.push.outputs.digest != '' }}
++        name: Tag the signed digest as the release (immutable v*-gitea tag)
++        uses: ./.github/actions/gitea-registry-tag
++        with:
++          registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
++          repository: ${{ env.IMAGE_PATH }}/${{ matrix.image }}
++          digest: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}
++          tag: ${{ github.ref_name }}-gitea
++          user: ${{ env.REGISTRY_USER }}
++          token: ${{ secrets.ZEGIT_CI_PACKAGE_TOKEN }}
++      - if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && steps.push.outputs.digest != '' }}
++        name: Emit the pin bump for this release
++        run: |
++          set -euo pipefail
++          case "$IMAGE" in
++            z-backend)         file=deployment/kustomize/base/deployment.yaml ;;
++            z-gateway-server)  file=deployment/kustomize/base-gateway/deployment.yaml ;;
++            *)                 echo "no pin file known for $IMAGE"; exit 0 ;;
++          esac
++          ref="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_PATH}/${IMAGE}:${TAG}-gitea@${DIGEST}"
++          {
++            echo "### Pin bump — \`${IMAGE}\` ${TAG}"
++            echo
++            echo "Run in a worktree on master, then commit and \`zg push gateway\`:"
++            echo
++            echo '```sh'
++            # Delimiter is | , not # : the REPLACEMENT ends in " # v0.0.NNN",
++            # so a # delimiter makes sed fail with "unknown option to 's'".
++            # Found by running the emitted command against a real manifest
++            # rather than reading it — a copy-paste that does not run is worse
++            # than none, because it is trusted.
++            # The whole reference, owner included: a release built under a new
++            # registry owner (RUNBOOK-TENANT-PACKAGES.md §3 step 6) moves the
++            # pin to that owner, not just to the new tag and digest.
++            echo "sed -i -E 's|[a-z0-9.-]+(/[a-z0-9._-]+)*/${IMAGE}:v[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+-gitea@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}( # v[0-9.]+)?|${ref} # ${TAG}|g' \\"
++            echo "  ${file}"
++            echo '```'
++            echo
++            echo "Resulting reference:"
++            echo
++            echo '```'
++            echo "$ref"
++            echo '```'
++          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
++          echo "pin bump for $IMAGE written to the job summary"
++        env:
++          IMAGE: ${{ matrix.image }}
++          DIGEST: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}
++          TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
++      - if: ${{ always() }}
++        name: Remove job-written credentials from the runner
++        run: |
++          rm -f "$HOME/.docker/config.json"
++          echo "credentials removed"
++      - if: ${{ always() }}
++        name: Sweep module credentials off the runner
++        uses: ./.github/actions/gitea-module-auth
++        with:
++          sweep: "true"
++      - if: ${{ always() }}
++        name: Remove this job's Go toolchain and caches
++        uses: ./.github/actions/isolated-go
++        with:
++          sweep: "true"
++      - if: ${{ always() }}
++        name: Remove this job's work directory
++        run: |
++          [ -z "${IMAGE_WORK:-}" ] || rm -rf "$IMAGE_WORK"
++    timeout-minutes: "30"
++    strategy:
++      fail-fast: "false"
++      matrix:
++        image:
++          - z-gateway-server
++      job-index: 1
++      job-total: 2
++
+diff --git a/internal/app/run/workflow_test.go b/internal/app/run/workflow_test.go
+index 2c8fafe..d326648 100644
+--- a/internal/app/run/workflow_test.go
++++ b/internal/app/run/workflow_test.go
+@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
+ package run
+ 
+ import (
++	"os"
+ 	"testing"
+ 
+ 	runnerv1 "code.forgejo.org/forgejo/actions-proto/runner/v1"
+@@ -76,3 +77,21 @@ jobs:
+ 		})
+ 	}
+ }
++
++// Gitea 28 adds job-index and job-total under strategy in the single-job
++// workflow it sends for a matrix job. testdata/gitea28-matrix-job.yml is the
++// payload of a real task, copied from the error of run 23992.
++func TestGenerateWorkflow_Gitea28MatrixJob(t *testing.T) {
++	payload, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/gitea28-matrix-job.yml")
++	require.NoError(t, err)
++
++	workflow, jobID, err := generateWorkflow(&runnerv1.Task{WorkflowPayload: payload})
++	require.NoError(t, err)
++
++	job := workflow.GetJob(jobID)
++	require.NotNil(t, job)
++	matrices, err := job.GetMatrixes()
++	require.NoError(t, err)
++	require.Len(t, matrices, 1)
++	assert.Equal(t, "z-gateway-server", matrices[0]["image"])
++}

push-image.sh

@@ -99,15 +99,27 @@ for arch in amd64 arm64; do
   docker push "$REPO:$TAG-$arch" || die "push failed for $arch"
 done
 
-docker manifest rm "$REPO:$TAG" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-docker manifest create "$REPO:$TAG" --amend "$REPO:$TAG-amd64" --amend "$REPO:$TAG-arm64"
-docker manifest push "$REPO:$TAG"
+# `docker manifest create` REFUSES a source that is itself a manifest list:
+#   ERROR: gitea.langenoja.se/...:<tag>-amd64 is a manifest list
+# With Docker's containerd image store, `docker build --platform linux/amd64`
+# produces an OCI index rather than a plain manifest, so both per-arch tags are
+# lists and the combine step fails after the (slow, large) pushes have already
+# succeeded — leaving the per-arch tags published and the plain tag absent,
+# which is the one the Deployments reference. Seen on 12.11.1-ci6, 2026-08-31.
+#
+# `buildx imagetools create` accepts indexes as sources and does the combine
+# registry-side, so it works with either image store.
+docker buildx imagetools create -t "$REPO:$TAG" "$REPO:$TAG-amd64" "$REPO:$TAG-arm64" \
+  || die "failed to combine the per-arch tags into $REPO:$TAG"
 
 # Verify by reading it back, rather than trusting the push's exit code.
 echo "verifying the published manifest lists both architectures"
-got=$(docker manifest inspect "$REPO:$TAG" | grep -o '"architecture": *"[a-z0-9]*"' | sort -u | wc -l)
-[ "$got" -ge 2 ] || die "published manifest does not list two architectures"
-docker manifest inspect "$REPO:$TAG" | grep -o '"architecture": *"[a-z0-9]*"' | sort -u
+inspect=$(docker buildx imagetools inspect "$REPO:$TAG") \
+  || die "published $REPO:$TAG cannot be read back"
+got=$(echo "$inspect" | grep -o 'linux/[a-z0-9]*' | sort -u | grep -cE 'linux/(amd64|arm64)')
+[ "$got" -ge 2 ] || die "published manifest does not list both architectures:
+$inspect"
+echo "$inspect" | grep -o 'linux/[a-z0-9]*' | sort -u
 
 cat <<EOF